



★ industrial ★ security ★ *AsIS Archive*

VOL. 1, No. 2

OCTOBER 1957

OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
OF THE
american society
for
industrial security



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Russell E. White
President
The American Society for
Industrial Security
Washington, D. C.



To the members of the American Society for Industrial Security assembled in their third annual convention, I send greetings.

The theme of your convention this year, "Industrial Security--Lifeguard of the Nation", exemplifies your mission to protect the industrial life of our country. For the welfare of our own people and our friends in the free world, it is vital that our plants and lines of communication be made secure from all potential hazards.

I commend the efforts of your Society in bringing together trained personnel to meet this need with vision, intelligence, and a careful regard for the basic rights of our citizens.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

★ industrial security ★

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
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AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Code of Ethics

*A*s members of the American Society for Industrial Security, we share a singular responsibility for maintaining inviolate the integrity and trust of the industrial security profession. In discharging this responsibility, therefore, we mutually pledge that:

- I. *We will endeavor, under God, to perform our professional duties in accordance with the highest moral principles.*
- II. *We will direct our concerted efforts toward the support, protection, and defense of the United States of America.*
- III. *We will labor vigilantly and unceasingly to thwart the activities of individuals or groups who seek to change or destroy our form of government by unconstitutional means.*
- IV. *We will strive to strengthen the nation by securing and conserving its industrial facilities.*
- V. *We will be faithful and diligent in discharging the duties entrusted to us, protecting the property and interests of employers and safeguarding the lives and well-being of employees.*
- VI. *We will observe strictly the precepts of truth, justice, accuracy, and prudence.*
- VII. *We will respect and protect confidential and privileged information.*
- VIII. *We will promote programs designed to raise standards, improve efficiency, and increase the effectiveness of industrial security.*
- IX. *We will work together toward the achievement of the professional objectives of the Society.*



LOYD WRIGHT

Lawyer; born and raised, San Jacinto, California.
 University of Southern California, 1915, LL. B.
 University of Ottawa, LL. D.
 Admitted to California Bar, 1915.
 Practiced continuously in Los Angeles since 1915, with exception of two years: 1917-1919.
 Service in Army: Served overseas as First Lieutenant in command of Company D, 8th Infantry, U. S. Army.
 Graduated from Civilian Course Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 1943.
 Served as member of Board of Appeals of the Attorney General for hearings of alien enemies, World War II.
 Member of Congressional Commission to study Federal Judicial and Congressional Salaries.
 Chairman, Commission on Government Security and various other Commissions of State and Federal Government.
 Past President, Los Angeles County Bar Association.
 Past President, State Bar of California.
 Past President, American Bar Association.
 Chairman of the House of Delegates of the International Bar Association.
 Vice President, Inter-American Bar Association.
 Past President, National Association of State Racing Commissioners; Order of Coif, Phi Delta Phi, Beatty Inn.

Toward a Working Program for Industrial Security

BY

LOYD WRIGHT, CHAIRMAN
 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY

The report of the Commission on Government Security was submitted in June of this year,¹ and its recommendations are currently under study by the Congress, the Executive Branch, and interested private citizens and organizations. Bills have been introduced in the Senate and in the House of Representatives to effectuate Commission recommendations which require legislation for their implementation. Hearings upon these proposals are expected to commence early next year when Congress reconvenes.

The Commission's report is concerned with some ten divisions of the nation's security programs. Certainly one of the most vital of these, and the most extensive, is the Industrial Security Program. The Commission's proposals in this area are embodied in several bills. In the Senate S. 2414, introduced by Senator Norris Cotton and Senator John Stennis, both Commission members, includes the recommended chapters, altering "The Industrial Personnel Security Programs."² Other similar bills have been introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives.³ All these bills are also concerned with other phases of the Federal Security Program.

On July 16, of this year, the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service of the House of Representatives heard testimony on the House bills. Further hearings were deferred in view of the imminence of Congressional adjournment. It is anticipated, however, that all these bills will be the subject of early Congressional action on the reconvening of the 85th Congress in January 1958. By that time, the Administration may be expected to have formulated its position on the Commission's recommendations as embodied in these bills, and to be prepared to act as well upon the Commission's proposals calling for Executive orders or directives.

During this interim period, I welcome the opportunity to discuss through the medium of *Industrial Security* some of the principal recommendations of the Commission in this vital area. We of the Commission are deeply indebted to many of you who will read these pages. In industry, many gave freely of their time and counsel to the end that we might achieve an accurate and thorough comprehension of the many problems with which industry is faced in this area. We received the aid of the officers and members of many organizations, including the Aircraft Industries Association, the Chamber of

¹Copies of the Report dated June 21, 1957, are available through the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

²Introduced June 27, 1957.

³S. 2399, introduced on June 26, 1957, by Senator Olin D. Johnston; H. R. 8322 and H. R. 8323, identical bills introduced by Representatives Tom Murray and Edward H. Rees on June 24, 1957; and H. R. 8334, introduced by Representative Edgar W. Hes-stand on June 24, 1957.

Commerce of the United States, and the National Security Industrial Association. Your own American Society for Industrial Security prepared a most comprehensive report for our consideration, representing the combined thinking of a large cross-section of firms experienced in this field. Officials of the Department of Defense, and the three military services, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other Governmental agencies in the industrial security field cooperated fully with the Commission and the members of our staff. If the assistance so generously offered us is typical of the spirit of mutual help between industry and government, and I am sure that it is, the industrial security program and the defense of our Nation's productive might is in good hands.

Whatever comment may be made concerning our industrial security program, we must not forget that it has had a comparatively short history, with its formal beginning dating no earlier than World War II.⁴ As one association put it "... it continues to suffer from growing pains necessitated by a rapid need for its existence without time for careful preparation. As each new problem arose, a solution has been fashioned which has caused the industrial security picture to resemble a patchwork quilt rather than a unified whole."⁵

This topsy-like growth is by no means limited to the industrial security area. The Senate Committee on Government Operations in reporting favorably on the bill to create the Commission on Government Security stated:

"The evidence before the Committee shows that our security system has developed in a gradual and piecemeal manner over the past decade. It should receive a careful, comprehensive review by the representative, bipartisan Commission proposed in this bill."⁶

In Public Law 304⁷ which established the Commission on Government Security the Congress found—

"It is vital to the welfare and safety of the United States that there be adequate protection of the national security, including the safeguarding of all national defense secrets and public and private defense installations, against loss or compromise arising from espionage, sabotage, disloyalty, subversive activities, or unauthorized disclosures."

It therefore declared it to be the policy of the Congress:

"That there shall exist a sound Government Program—(a) establishing procedures for . . . appropriate security requirements with respect to persons privately employed or occupied on work requiring access to national defense secrets or work affording significant opportunity for injury to the national security."

The Commission in its Report made recommendations for the implementation of this policy as to an appropriate standard,⁸ security criteria,⁹ investigative

procedures,¹⁰ screening procedures,¹¹ security hearings and appeals,¹² and related matters.

In conjunction with its study of clearance procedures the Commission examined the basic structures of the industrial security program, its objectives, policies, and administration. We concluded that despite great progress in the last few years the program is far too large and complex, that it operates with less than maximum efficiency and economy, and has produced a loss of perspective by contractors and Government alike.

In our analysis of the program we addressed our attention to two principal questions:

1. Is a program of the present magnitude necessary to adequately protect the national security?
2. Can its present administration be reorganized to promote greater efficiency and economy without sacrifice of the national security?

From the evidence received, we felt that the first question should be answered in the negative and the second in the affirmative.

On the question of size, the Commission studied the purposes which lie at the foundation of the program. The Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation¹³ defines industrial security as "That portion of internal security which is concerned with the protection of classified information in the hands of United States industry." With the complementary phases of industrial security—personnel security and the protection of facilities—the core of all security safeguards is the necessity of safeguarding classified information. Obviously, therefore, a determining factor in the consideration of the size of the program is the amount of information currently being classified.

Of the three categories of classification authorized by current Executive Order 10501,¹⁴ the classification "Confidential" is by far the most frequently used. The Department of Defense estimates that 59% of its classified material is "Confidential."¹⁵ Estimates of the number of persons granted Confidential clearances alone run over two million.¹⁶

In addition to this ever-pyramiding mass of information classified under the authority of the Executive Order, however, the Commission found that many documents were being arbitrarily restricted by timorous Government officials through the liberal use of rubber stamps with such enigmatic warnings as "for official use only," "not for publication," "administratively confidential," and "limited office use only." Fortunately, this overcautious practice of document suppression was largely checked by the issuance of the Executive Order. Furthermore, individual agency efforts to continue to cloak non-security information

(Continued on page 24)

⁴For a summary of the history of the industrial security program, see the Commission's Report; p. 236 & ff.

⁵Report of the National Security Industrial Association to the Commission, dated October 31, 1956.

⁶Senate Report No. 581, to accompany S. J. Res. 21, 84th Congress, 1st Session.

⁷Eighty-Fourth Congress, 1st Session, approved August 9, 1955.

⁸Commission on Government Security Report, p. 267.

⁹Commission on Government Security Report, p. 268.

¹⁰Commission on Government Security Report, p. 279.

¹¹Commission on Government Security Report, p. 280.

¹²Commission on Government Security Report, pp. 284, 285.

¹³Section 1-217, September 1956.

¹⁴Effective December 15, 1953.

¹⁵C. G. S. Report, p. 176.

¹⁶Report of the N. S. I. A. to C. G. S. dated October 31, 1956, p. 2; Report of A. S. I. S. to C. G. S. dated November 5, 1956, p. 6 A.

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BY CLARENCE BRACY
GENERAL CHAIRMAN, ASIS
THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION/SEMINAR

OUR THIRD ANNUAL SEMINAR

You Can't Afford to Miss It!

Much has been said concerning the benefits derived by meeting and talking with others engaged in the same profession, business or trade. It is generally recognized that through such association it is possible to learn of the techniques, skills, and experiences from those in the same field of endeavor. Scientists have saved many hours of scientific research simply by exchanging ideas, knowledge of previous research, and generally exchanging scientific information. The same can apply to our field, the Security profession.

Our annual meeting affords each of us the opportunity to reward ourselves with information in our field, and we are sure to come away better equipped to deal with the problems which confront us in our daily activities. If, for example, the number of years of experience of the persons handling our workshops at our Seminar were added together, it would represent hundreds of years of knowledge. This knowledge, when disseminated to us, helps us to find the best and most practical methods of doing our jobs and, as such, reflects a more efficient job being done for the companies or organizations we represent. It is a rare person, indeed, who professes to "know all" concerning his profession, and who cannot learn from others. This is particularly true in a field where there has been an insignificant amount of the printed word available for study and review.

Our Annual Seminar is one all Society members truly cannot afford to miss as it offers the opportunity to learn how to do our jobs more effectively. A single idea gathered during our Seminar—if placed into effect either now or at some *future* date—may well be worth the time and effort spent in attending this important event. Also not to be overlooked is the value of bringing others, in addition to your wife, as guests. I say "... in addition to your wife" ... advisedly, as it is assumed we all know the value of bringing her. An interesting program has been arranged to keep the wives occupied while we are engaged in workshops, panel discussions, or other business sessions, and everything possible will be done to make her stay in Washington most enjoyable. What may be readily overlooked, however, is that there are many persons within our organizations who are not Society members, but may be richly rewarded by attending.

The persons we report to within our respective organizations, and who most likely handle other functions in addition to ours, are excellent prospects to bring with us to the Seminar. The same is true of other persons within our organizations including those who may not be in the executive or official category. Bring as many persons with you as you wish in order that they may receive the benefits of our sessions first hand.

Where else can so much information be obtained at one time and place concerning our field of endeavor?

See you at 9:00 A. M. on October 28, in the East Room of the Mayflower Hotel.

THIRD ANNUAL SEMINAR HIGHLIGHTS

Theme: "Industrial Security — Lifeguard of the Nation"

OCTOBER 28, 29 and 30 MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Panel Discussions:

1. "Does Industrial Security Suppress Civil Liberty?"
2. "How ASIS Benefits the Membership & How These Benefits Can be Increased"

Workshops:

1. "Why Applicant Investigations Are a Must in Industry"
A. ROSS MILLER, *North American Aviation, Inc.*
2. "Major Application of Electronic Devices in Industrial Security"
CHARLES LAForge, *Chairman, Subcommittee on Electronic and Electric Devices*
3. "Controls on Classified Matter—Are They Realistic?"
JAMES A. DAVIS, *Chairman, Committee on Safeguarding Classified Information*
4. "Reduction of Fire Hazards in Industry"
HORATIO BOND, *Committee on Fire Protection*
5. "Industrial Disaster Control Plans"
KARSTEN FLORY, *Chairman, Committee on Emergency Planning*
6. "How Effective are Fences in Protecting Our Facilities?"
KENNETH YANDELL, *Chairman, Subcommittee on Physical Protection Items*
7. "Purpose of Employee Identification"
WILLIAM TODD, *Committee on Identification*
8. "Industrial Guard Functions"
WILLIAM SELBY, *Subcommittee on Guards and Guard Patrols*
9. "Security—The Objective View"
JOHN BUCKLEY, *Varian Associates*

Reports:

ASIS Officer and Committee Reports will be presented.

Registration And Other Fees

For complete breakdown of Seminar and other costs see Convention Registration Committee report on page 12.

"Shop" Talks:

1. "Indoctrinating Employees to Properly Safeguard Classified Matter"
2. "The Need for Training Plant Protection Personnel"
3. "Why Plant Protection Policy on a Corporate Basis?"
4. "The Composite Security Director"

Luncheons:

Three group luncheons are planned with interesting speakers of national prominence.

Banquet:

A fine dinner preceded by a reception will make this a Convention highlight. Mr. Loyd Wright, Chairman of the Commission on Government Security, will speak.

Wives' Activities:

Sightseeing trips and other functions have been arranged for the wives.

Free Attendance Kits—

For Registrants Only

A package of select material to take away with you which can be used for reference purposes.

ASIS CONVENTION / SEMINAR SPEAKERS

S. J. TRACY, CHAIRMAN, SPEAKERS COMMITTEE



L. FANEUF

S. S. JACKSON

L. WRIGHT

It is the purpose of the American Society for Industrial Security to extend knowledge in the industrial security profession and to enhance the profession to the end that the industrial strength of our Country will be preserved. The end product is the protection of employees in plants throughout the Nation, the protection of the plants themselves and finally the protection of all citizens. It is a tremendous responsibility.

At the coming national Seminar we will hear from knowledgeable individuals. At the banquet Mr. Loyd Wright, Chairman of the Commission on Government Security, will be the speaker. Mr. Wright, a prominent attorney in Los Angeles, is a past president of the American Bar Association, Chairman of the House of Delegates, International Bar Association, and a member of the Commission on Judicial and Congressional Salaries and other State and National commissions.

Mr. Wright was chosen as Chairman of the bi-partisan commission on government security created by Congress to fill an urgent need for an objective, non-political and independent study of the innumerable laws, Executive Orders, regulations, programs, practices, and procedures intended for the protection of the national security. The industrial security programs, the classification of documents program and others are of immediate concern of our Society. Mr. Wright's address should prove not only interesting but profitable to us. We are proud that our immediate past president, Mr. Paul Hansen, was a member of the Citizens' Advisory Committee of Mr. Wright's Commission.

On the opening day, October 28, the luncheon speaker will be Mr. Leston Faneuf, President of the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo, New York.

Mr. Faneuf is in his second year as President of Bell Aircraft, one of the leading companies in the nation's aviation industry. Mr. Faneuf succeeded Lawrence D. Bell, the late founder of the company which bears his name.

We are certain to be rewarded by the remarks of Mr. Faneuf, who is considered an outstanding speaker and who has great appreciation of the industrial security program.

The luncheon speaker on October 30 will be a top-flight government official, Mr. Stephen S. Jackson,


Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve.) Mr. Jackson has had experience in the fields of workmen's compensation law and social security. He is a member of the bar of New York in which he engaged in the private practice of law in addition to being a member of the bench.

He has had extensive experience in the formulation of security policies of the Department of Defense, including industrial security.

Between 1947 and 1955, there grew up a vast, intricate, confusing and costly complex of temporary, inadequate, and sometimes uncoordinated programs and measures designed to protect secrets and installations vital to the defense of the Nation. The ceaseless campaign of international communism to infiltrate both government, industry and other vital areas not only was threatening our military and industrial strength but was intended to impair our national economy. It is the responsibility of industry and of our Society to see that America remains strong. Our speakers are individuals who can contribute greatly to our knowledge of what needs to be done.

Those attending the convention will also be interested to know that we will have with us Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld of the Washington Hebrew Congregation, who was also a member of the Citizens' Advisory Committee of the Commission on Government Security, and Dr. Charles W. Lowry of the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order. Dr. Lowry is a nationally known foe of communism. We will also have with us Monsignor E. Robert Arthur of St. Matthews Cathedral of Washington who is familiar with many national security problems. The armed forces will be represented by Chaplain (Brigadier General) Terence P. Finnegan, Deputy Chief of Air Force Chaplains, at the banquet. The invocation for the opening day session on October 28 will be given by Chaplain (Colonel) James F. Patterson, Office of the Chief of Air Force Chaplains.

The theme of the Seminar is "Industrial Security—Lifeguard of the Nation" and our speakers program is geared to give us the benefit of the thinking of top-flight individuals who are in a position to be of assistance to us in our future work and plans. Do not miss this Seminar.



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CONVENTION COMMITTEE REPORTS

Seminar Registration Committee

THOMAS O'CONNOR, CHAIRMAN

Seminar registration material has been forwarded to ASIS members. Your early return of the registration card will assist the Seminar Committee in planning and handling of registrations.

For the convenience of those arriving in Washington on Sunday, the day before the Seminar convenes, the registration desk will be open in the Mayflower Hotel from 3:00 p. m. to 8:00 p. m.

The fee for Seminar registration is \$15.00; the three luncheons on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday are \$4 each and the banquet and reception on Wednesday, \$15. Purchased individually, the costs amount to \$42. We are offering a package plan, including registration, luncheons and banquet for \$40. Individual or extra luncheon and banquet tickets may be purchased at the registration desk for the above prices.

Complete wives' activities, including three luncheons and two tours, will be approximately \$16. Individual tickets may be purchased at the time of registration. This does not include wives' tickets for the Banquet and Reception which, of course, can also be purchased at the Registration Desk.

Publicity Committee

RAYMOND C. SPROW, CHAIRMAN

"INDUSTRIAL SECURITY—

LIFEGUARD OF THE NATION"



Have you thought much about the theme of the Convention/Seminar? If not, please start thinking about it, and you will realize the importance of Security to our nation's defense. This realization will, in turn, make you more anxious to attend the Washington sessions to participate in policy formulation and to derive untold knowledge from the prominent speakers informative panels.

Considerable planning and work have gone into the 1957 Convention/Seminar. Its success depends upon the active participation of the members.

Exhibit Committee

P. C. WOLZ, CHAIRMAN

Those of us who attended last year's Convention were impressed with the exhibitors and their products. We returned home somewhat richer in ideas

for broadening and strengthening our security programs.

This year the Committee has lined up somewhat over three times as many exhibits covering a wide field of items of use in plant protection, fire prevention, safety, record security and many others.

All coffee breaks for example will be held in the Exhibit Room. This will permit having refreshments while at the same time looking at the exhibits.

Reception Committee

A. T. DEERE, CHAIRMAN



The Reception Committee has been working hard and long toward making this Convention the most successful, particularly from the women's point of view. A full schedule of activities has been planned for the women, and Dottie Quinn assures us that the program is designed to provide a maximum of entertainment with a minimum of effort, and appropriate breaks for freshening up, spending money, etc. The wives' activity calendar includes tours of places of interest in the Washington area.

A Post-Convention tour is planned to Jamestown and Williamsburg, Va.

Accommodations Committee

EDGAR L. ROBBINS, CHAIRMAN




The Mayflower Hotel, located in the Connecticut Avenue area of the nation's capital, is one of America's outstanding convention centers—luxurious yet completely practical. It has numerous meeting, exhibit and function rooms, six restaurants, and one thousand tastefully decorated guest rooms, all completely air-conditioned. Noted for the finest in food and service, it is convenient to shopping, theaters and leading department stores.

The entire Convention will meet each day in the Williamsburg Room for luncheon and an address by an outstanding speaker. The highlight of the Convention will be a Reception in the Chinese Room, and the annual Banquet in the beautiful and spacious Grand Ball Room, Wednesday evening.

We are making every effort to anticipate your needs and plan for your convenience, comfort and pleasure.

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Functions of the Security Director in Industry

The following is the text of a talk delivered by Timothy J. Walsh, Security Director, Allen B. Du Mont Laboratories, Inc., Clifton, New Jersey on the occasion of a joint industrial-military security symposium held at Du Mont's East Paterson, New Jersey plant on May 29th, 1957.



TIMOTHY J. WALSH

The explosions which shattered the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 were not as significant for ending the Pacific War as they were for opening an era in world history. Man had unlocked the secret to global transformation—and its first use was to destroy a small part of that globe. Now, a full twelve years later, the destructive power of the discovery has been multiplied *fifty times* but the application for good is still in awkward infancy. Why are people bent on apparent genocide? What force compels man to fashion the most efficient tools possible for his own destruction?

A moment's reflection will provide at least a partial answer. The atom bombs of 1945 ended the costliest war in recorded history *without* the million and one-half additional allied casualties that would have resulted from an invasion of Japan. By this twist of

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Security Director and Coordinator for Mobilization Planning with Allen B. Du Mont Laboratories, Inc., of Clifton, New Jersey, Mr. Walsh joined the firm in October 1956. He served previously with the Office of Naval Intelligence and with the Office of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, United States Air Force. He is a member of the bar of the State of New York and a member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Communications Arts, Fordham University. He is a charter member of the Industrial Security Institute, a member of the American Society for Industrial Security, the New York State Bar Association and the Bronx County Bar Association. He is a graduate of Fordham and St. John's Universities and has attended the Department of Defense Industrial Security Management Course. He is also a reserve officer of the United States Air Force attached to Air Intelligence.

irony the bomb was a benefit *because* of its very lethality.

But why the continued race for bigger and more powerful bombs? Again the answer is clear in the pages of the recent past. In 1945 America was at last awakening to the specter of international communism. The shadow of the Kremlin fell across the surrender tables on the Missouri. It loomed ominous at the birth of the U. N. in San Francisco. It blanketed China. We were confident, however, that our exclusive possession of the A-Bomb would prevent another World War for at least eight years. Eight years during which we could consolidate our position and build a lasting peace. But President Truman's announcement of nuclear experiments inside Russia and public revelation of the sordid facts of atomic espionage changed the picture. The staggering truth was that the most precious secrets in our national possession had been stolen. Overnight the tremendous advantage we *thought* we had vanished! No longer the assurance of peace, even for a time. From that day we have been pitted in an arms race of gigantic magnitude. Instead of a lead of years we have been reduced to a lead of months or weeks, and in some cases, no lead at all. That, is why we continue to build "ultimate weapons." Loss of the small advantage we still have could mean the end of everything.

In this tense struggle for weapons supremacy the job of development and manufacture has fallen to Industry. And in our system that is entirely proper. Private enterprise and civilian production genius are indispensable elements of American tradition. Without industrial support our National Military Establishment would be sterile—our position as World Leader for peace would be untenable.

(Continued on page 30)

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Kidde engineer points to inconspicuous Ultrasonic transmitter.

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
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Security Chief checks alignment of Photo-Electric projector.

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Major Chester R. Allen

INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE

What it means to you!



Captain Hugo C. Sanford

As the atomic age approaches its zenith, the basic tenets of warfare are undergoing a steady and decisive change. Automation, rather than replacing the individual soldier, is increasing both his productive capacity and his dependence upon modern equipment. Moving into what historians of the future will call the decisive decades of this atomic century, we must rely directly upon the industrial productive capacity of our nation. As soldiers we depend upon that industrial production for the implements of our profession; as citizens, we depend upon industrial production for the necessities of living. Our national ability to continue in our role as arsenal of the free world is directly proportional to our continued capability to produce the implements vital to both military and economic survival. The singular import of this fact was pinpointed by President Eisenhower in the special industry issue of "Civil Defender" magazine, in which he states, "These are unique days of peril to the civilian population, to the security of our cities, our industries and their peoples. The decisions this problem requires are difficult and involve inconvenience and expense. But the program for Industrial Defense may constitute the most valuable investment you

can make toward assuring our survival as a free nation."

The gravity of the situation is emphatically illustrated by statistics. Successful enemy attack upon seventeen target cities of our United States Production Base would destroy 58.1% of our electrical machinery industry, 54.2% of our transportation equipment, 41.9% of our chemical industry, 49.1% of our petroleum and coal products, 47.8% of the instrument industry, 54.7% of our primary and fabricated metals production, 29% of rubber products, and 42.6% of all machine manufacturing plants. At the same time, we would lose 47.8% of the total urban population of the United States. Seventeen hits and 50% of all essential defense industry could be DESTROYED.

The reduction of industrial vul-

nerability within the Army is being accomplished through the Department of Defense Industrial Defense Program, under supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The program is monitored by the Provost Marshal General, and includes the training of Industrial Defense Survey Officers.

The purpose of the Department of Defense Industrial Defense Program is the reduction of vulnerability of Key Industrial Facilities listed on the Department's Key Facilities List, through the voluntary participation of management. This reduction of vulnerability is designed to minimize the effects of damage from covert and overt attack, as well as that sustained from any type of disaster and includes such parasitic industrial plagues as

(Continued on page 33)



Above photo is a view of the Industrial Defense Classroom at The Provost Marshal General's School.

The co-authors of this article are on the staff of the Industrial Defense and Physical Security Section, The Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.



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THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY IN

THOMAS J. ROUNER
VICE PRESIDENT
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BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

In viewing the performance of the electric utility industry under various emergency conditions some fundamental differences are seen to exist between it and other vital industries.

An electric utility cannot stockpile its product. Neither can its customers build up inventories of kilowatt-hours. The electricity must be produced at the very same instant the customer chooses to use it, whether that customer is a home, a store or a factory. There is no time lag between the electric switch at the customer's end of the line and the generator in the powerhouse.

This basic characteristic of the power industry has a profound influence upon both the designer and the operator of an electric utility system. Every utility system is designed and planned to cope with the various natural and manmade emergencies that experience has shown to be native to its territory.

Power Essential to National Security

Electric power is essential to the health, safety and welfare of our population and therefore is essential to our national security. Being a service business, an electric utility must do everything possible to see that the service is continuously available. This effort breaks down into two general periods of action, viz., the pre-emergency and the post-emergency phases.

In the pre-emergency period the design and operation of electric facilities are aimed at providing a maximum feasible resistance to all threatening hazards that might interrupt service. Multiple dispersed sources of power, alternate transmission routes to important load centers, reserve capacity, and interconnections with neighboring power systems are standard practices in the effort to insure continuous electric service.

In the post-emergency period every effort is made to restore electric service as soon as possible to those customers who can still use it. This involves the use of trained crews brought in from undamaged areas, the installation of spare equipment held for such emergencies, the re-routing of power flow and other measures.

Peacetime Emergencies

The scope of peacetime threats to utility service include hurricanes, tornados, ice storms, blizzards, floods, fires, explosions, human errors and mechanical failures. Many utility systems, because of their geographic locations, are free from some of these hazards. Other systems are subject to the full list.

One of the most devastating of these hazards is the hurricane. A brief review will be made of the steps taken by a utility to minimize the damaging effects of a hurricane, as well as to restore service in areas of breakdown.

Design criteria for outdoor structures, including transmission towers, must provide for anticipated hurricane wind velocities. Similarly, the design and layout of electric facilities along tidewater must anticipate the hazards due to hurricane tidal waves and to salt spray and other wind-borne material on outdoor electrical apparatus.

The most widespread destruction will befall low tension distribution lines along tree shaded streets and roads.

In most such areas the replacement of overhead wires with underground service has repeatedly been found to be prohibitive in cost and of questionable value service-wise. Some progress is being made in a co-



CONNECTICUT RIVER IN FLOOD

RY IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME EMERGENCIES



ON THE JOB AFTER THE STORM

operative effort among local municipal officials, the power companies and property owners, whereby a selective tree planting and tree removal program will reduce the storm hazard to distribution lines.

But since hurricanes strike at unpredictable times and places, they will always produce extensive damages. Therefore a planned major effort must be directed at restoring electric service at the earliest possible date.

Electric utility systems have long been accustomed to responding to one another's call for help in time of emergency. This response has been expanded and sharpened greatly in recent years as hurricanes have shown a tendency to wander off their conventional paths, and as the public has become more and more dependent upon electricity for its convenience, health and safety.

Emergency mutual aid practices among utilities involve a ready exchange of electricity, manpower, equipment and materials.

Under modern methods of storm forecasting and tracking, it is customary for a utility lying in the path of the oncoming storm to maintain constant communication with a number of utilities outside the predicted path, thereby alerting them for the anticipated request for assistance. In case the approaching hurricane is of great severity, crews of men may be dispatched before the arrival of the storm.

As soon as the storm has abated so that men can move around with safety, damage surveys are made

and results communicated by mobile radio or other means to a headquarters where appraisals are made as to the need for additional manpower and equipment for prompt restoration. Line crews from nearby utilities generally travel in their fully-equipped line trucks. Where distances are great, the assisting line trucks are frequently sent overland with relief drivers, while the trained crewmen travel by air, train, bus or car to their designated points of rendezvous. Work is assigned by local supervisors, who also provide housing, food, and necessary transportation for the visiting crews.

Close liaison is maintained with Civil Defense and with various other federal, state, and municipal agencies.

Wartime Emergencies

Wartime damage to power company facilities can result from sabotage or from bombing.

Protection from sabotage involves a number of efforts that are practice by utilities, some of which are as follows:

- Care in selection of employees. This is simplified because of the relatively small turnover in utility employees.

- Training of employees to be alert to subversive persons around utility property and personnel.
- Fencing, protecting and guarding of critical areas.
- Maintenance of high standards in safety and first-aid practices.

- Providing specialized fire protection equipment and training of employees in fire protection practices.

The effects of bombing with modern atomic and hydrogen weapons fall upon both the trained man-

(Continued on next page)



ELECTRIC SERVICE COMING UP AFTER THE BLOW

Electric Industry (Continued)

power and the physical facilities of a power system.

From a manpower standpoint electric utilities are set up, organizationally, to produce and distribute power throughout every hour of the day, week and year. Also, most power systems extend over quite wide areas, geographically, with the result that in both operating and supervisory personnel they have a natural dispersion of forces, thus leaving them less subject to a wiping out of essential personnel than many other more concentrated enterprises. This should not lead to complacency since there are numerous features of advance planning that will aid in carrying on the operation in time of emergency, including such items as:

Delegation of authority and dispersion of management.

Assignment of employees to alternate assembly centers and alternate work assignments.

Training of employees in first-aid, emergency feeding, radiological monitoring, fire fighting, communications, etc.

Inherent Protection From Bombing

From a physical plant standpoint and its vulnerability to bombing, nearly every electric utility is in a less vulnerable position than are the customers which it serves. This was demonstrated at the 1955 atomic bomb test at Yucca Flats, Nevada. Conventional transmission lines, substations and distribution lines were constructed at varying distances from the ground zero of the bomb. Similarly other interests installed factory buildings, homes, industrial machinery and other facilities of various designs in order to determine their resistance to bombing. Technical analysis of the test clearly showed that the damage to the electric utility facilities was relatively less than the damages to the property of the users of the electricity, and therefore, the job of restoring electric service to the recoverable users should be able to keep abreast of the needs.

Operation Alert 1956, a Civil De-

fense test exercise, supplied another revealing indication of the lesser vulnerability of electric generating facilities to simulated widespread bombing of the populous centers of this country.

The assumed attack consisted of the dropping of nuclear bombs on 76 critical areas. Following the announcement of the location of the ground zeros, on the day of the attack, and with advice as to the size and other characteristics of the bombs, prompt damage analyses were made by trained utility employees working as technical staff men on Civil Defense (and Department of Interior) emergency organizations.

Working from blast damage charts and tables the technicians determined both the amount of the electrical generation losses as well as the amount of load that was wiped out through the demolition of electric customers' facilities. The computed nationwide power generation loss was 19,600,000 kilowatts while the corresponding load loss was 22,300,000 kilowatts, or a ratio of 1 to 1.14.

Thus the wide dispersion of electric generating plants provides an inherent advantage against modern bombing attack. And the program of providing a dispersed pattern of power generating stations continues as additional sources of steam-electric power, hydro-electric power and atomic-electric power are added to the nation's power network.

In spite of these favorable demonstrations, widespread distresses in electric power supply will result from enemy action in time of war. Therefore, it is appropriate that the electric industry continue its efforts among its own members as well as with the various governmental agencies to insure the earliest possible electric service restoration in the event of enemy attack.

Advance planning is needed in many fields, some of which are as follows:

Further clarification in the roles of both civil and military authorities with respect to the electric industry.

Clearer definition of policies and practices relative to evacuation and shelter.

Firming up of liaison between the electric industry and the Civil Defense Agency and other governmental organizations.

Establishment and training of the area organizations being developed by the Department of Interior under delegation from Federal Civil Defense Agency for restoring electric service following an enemy attack and providing electric service to support areas.

Further attention to the organizations that will determine the priority of restoration of damaged areas.

Perfection of radiological monitoring and reporting.

Connecting up of diverse communication facilities within and between utility systems.

Establishment of priorities that will insure the allocation of needed fuel and other supplies for power generation.


Establishment of priorities in the use and restoration of communication and transportation facilities, including unimpeded movement across state lines.

Establishment of priorities in the assignment of manpower and facilities normally serving the utility industry, as contractors, engineers, suppliers, etc.

Thus, while the electric industry is in relatively good shape from a national defense standpoint, there are many areas that require much further attention.

Frank V. Martinek Resigns As Director

The Board of Directors has regretfully accepted the resignation of Frank V. Martinek as a Director. His professional ability and years of experience in the industrial security field have aided greatly in the formation of the ASIS. The Board of Directors and the Society will miss his counseling advice.




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Suite 317

I hope to use this column as a means of letting you members know what goes on in ASIS as a whole as well as to supply items of interest which may help us to get to know each other. You can help along this line by sending me the minutes of your chapter meetings and data of meetings you plan on having. If you are in Washington stop in and say hello. I have written to most of you during the past year, but as yet have only met a few of you.

Captain Hugo Sanford of Fort Gordon has stopped in the office several times and from all reports he and Major Chester Ailen seem to be doing an excellent job of recruiting for ASIS in that area—Ralph Schriener of General Electric stopped by to say hello recently while in Washington. Several of the Washington members stop in the office from time to time, such as Stan Tracy, Frank Stanton, Clarence Bracy, Dorothea Quinn, Paul Cooper, and Colonel Sid Rubenstein.

We now have 13 chapters of ASIS organized throughout the U. S., namely: Chicago; Detroit; Dallas-Fort Worth; Houston; Louisville; Newark; New England at East Hartford, Connecticut; New York; Pittsburgh; Northern California at San Francisco; Southern California at Los Angeles; Western New York at Buffalo and Washington, D. C. Our Detroit Chapter recently held a meeting and from the minutes their meeting seemed to be a very profitable one. They enclosed some pictures of the meeting, and I think this is a good idea for all chapters. We would like to run an article later in the "Industrial Security" magazine on the activities of the different chapters, and pictures certainly will add interest to the column.

Detroit appears to be progressing very well under the able chairmanship of Lee Malone, with Gene Kelly as Secretary. Dick Smith and John Ellington of Dallas are doing an excellent job of building up the membership in that area. Houston recently held its organizational meeting and seems to have stirred up a great deal of ASIS interest in their vicinity. The Louisville Chapter continues to hold their monthly meetings with the aid of "Mr. ASIS Himself," Paul

Hansen. What has happened to the Newark chapter—no word to date? Jack Buckley of Varian Associates continues to do an excellent job of salesmanship with regard to ASIS in the San Francisco area. George Thomson of North American Aviation and Membership Chairman of the Southern California Chapter has been doing an excellent job of soliciting members in the L. A. region. The Washington, D. C. chapter has held numerous meetings and there is real interest here. If things continue at the rate they are going I am certain it will be one of our largest chapters. This should afford competition to get more members for those chapters located in industrial cities. I want to thank John F. McCauley with General Electric in Phoenix, Arizona for the efforts he is making in trying to recruit members there so that they will be able to form a chapter.

May I call to your attention and impress upon you again the existence of our able Placement Committee. Thus far, our Placement Committee has not been too active and I believe this is because of the primary fact that industry is not aware that we even have such a committee. I have numerous personal resumes on file and urge each of you to check our files first for any openings that may come up within your company and where you are in a position to influence the hiring of security personnel. This can be a really fine service for ASIS members as well as non-members and we urge you to utilize it.

The members of ASIS located in the Chicago area may find of interest the "Conference on Freedom and Responsibility in the Industrial Community" to be held Oct. 23, 1957, at Levy Meyer Hall at Northwestern University. This Conference is sponsored by Northwestern University School of Law. From their program it is believed it will be worth your time to attend. For further information on this I suggest you contact Northwestern University School of Law.

I hope this bit of chit-chat will be of interest to you. We have been working quite hard to make the coming convention successful and I hope to meet all of you there. In the meantime—let me know what is "news" with you.

See you at the Convention - - - -

VIRGINIA EGELSTON

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT SECURITY COURSE

For the past year the Department of Defense has been conducting an intensive five-day briefing for security officials of industry at Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland. The course is held about once each month. Any person engaged in industrial security work in industry or in colleges, universities or research organizations on classified defense projects is eligible to attend.

Anyone interested in attending should contact his cognizant security office for further information.




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
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Loyd Wright (Continued)

with unauthorized, artificial restrictions have been impeded if not stopped through the efforts of the Special Subcommittee on Government Information of the House Committee on Government Operations which, beginning in the 84th Congress, has directed a searching spotlight toward reluctance of the Executive Branch to disclose Government operations.

The Commission, therefore, directed its study on an analysis of those classification categories provided for in the Executive Order.

There is no question of the necessity or soundness of the classifications Top Secret and Secret. The Top Secret classification, under the order "shall be applied only to that information or material . . . the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation." The Secret classification is authorized "only for defense information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation." Clear illustrations of each type of situation requiring these classifications are set out in the Executive Order.

The classification "Confidential," on the other hand, is authorized "only for defense information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which *could be prejudicial* to the defense interests of the Nation." (Emphasis added.) Conceivably, the disclosure of any defense information or material could be "prejudicial" to our "defense interests." Rarely do individual pieces of information greatly help the enemy. It is when different items are pieced together to form the larger picture that the harm is done. Obviously, however, we cannot throw security safeguards around every scrap of information that "could" possibly prejudice our defense. To dilute the focus of our security program to this extent would, in fact, be "prejudicial" to our Secret and Top Secret data and necessitate an administrative program unbearable in cost and impossible of management. The uncertainties of the Confidential classification are compounded by the fact that the Executive Order fails to cite any illustrations indicative of its intended application.

In view of the vague area meant to be encompassed by the classification "Confidential," the abundance of documents and other materials so classified, and their direct relationship to the magnitude of the industrial security program, the Commission early in its study, therefore, was faced with the primary issue whether the "Confidential" category could be abolished. In our considered judgment it could, and we so recommended.¹⁷

Before taking this precipitous step, the Commission examined the actual use of the "Confidential" classification. We studied a number of documents bearing this classification which came to us in the course of business. Some of them treated of matters which could be said to fall within the prescribed definition

only on the impossible basis, referred to above, that the disclosure of any defense information could be prejudicial to our defense interests; many should not have been classified at all. We confirmed to our amazement that Government, though protesting the necessity of the classification, permits each contractor to clear his employees for access to Confidential on the simple proof of citizenship and the absence of known derogatory information. There is no full field investigation nor even a national agency check. In fact, any valid derogatory information a contractor receives would be the result of sheer happenstance or individual ingenuity since the official files of federal, state, and local investigative and law enforcement agencies are usually closed to him.

I think that your Society report to the Commission properly wrote off this paradoxical situation in stating:

"There appears to be no connection between the criteria for classifying information in the confidential category and the criteria (if any exist) for granting access to confidential information . . . It is not necessary to be in the business of industrial security for long to appreciate what little interest the military had evinced in the procedures by which employees are granted Confidential clearances . . ."¹⁸

Official sources readily admit the inconsistency of the Government's position but point to the great cost and administrative difficulties involved if the Government were to take over the responsibility for clearing for access to Confidential. In short then, the Government's position is this: In the face of the management burden involved, it is willing to take a calculated risk that the national security will not be jeopardized. As one official in industry has put it

" . . . sheer administrative convenience has led to allowing an employer to 'clear' for the large volume of work which is 'confidential.' "¹⁹

Many officials have objected and more will no doubt join them, to the Commission's recommendation that the Confidential category be eliminated. A similar clamor met the abolition of the previous category of "Restricted." The wielders of the security stamps, of course, recovered brilliantly from that blow by the ingenious device of inventing a new classification, "Confidential-Modified Handling Authorized." Whatever may be the intended purpose of this category, it should be plain that it, too, falls within the purview of the Commission's recommendation. If, of course, the Government—and particularly the military—needs some such device to meet an internal situation, it should so demonstrate. But additional restrictions should not be imposed on defense contractors.

It would be ingenious indeed to state that the abolition of "Confidential" will not precipitate certain administrative and other difficulties, particularly in the defense establishment. You cannot create a

(Continued on page 26)

¹⁸Report dated November 5, 1956, p. 11 B.

¹⁹William J. Barron, Labor Relations Counsel, General Electric Company, in an address closing the proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on Labor, New York University, 1956.

¹⁷C. G. S. Report, pp. 174-176 and 304-305.

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
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

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Loyd Wright (Continued)

Frankenstein of such proportions and simply wish it away. To mitigate the transition period the Commission, therefore, recommended that the discontinuance of the category apply to *future* classifications except that industry be permitted *immediately* to discontinue clearances relating to contracts presently so classified.

The difficulties incident to its abolition, however, should not be sufficient reason to justify continuing a system we cannot defend, particularly in the light of the heavy cost to industry, the never-ceasing accumulation of papers requiring protection, and, more serious, the loss of security perspective. There is no validity to the premise "a little bit of security is better than no security," for in the impulse to cover the waterfront we will inadequately protect the vital areas. "We must either approach almost perfect security or dispense with it entirely in certain areas, for one does not acquire, as in other phases of procurement, a certain percentage of security for the amount of money spent. The largest of secrets can slip through the smallest of holes, and a single imperfection can negate the entire program."²⁰ If the Government is willing to gamble on a citizenship check and a clean public reputation as the basis for clearance, it should go one step further and assume that industry in the course of its normal personnel policies will hire persons of acceptable character and trust to work on routine defense projects. The Government's obvious minimization of the Confidential category logically raises a presumption that it should be abolished. In the absence of adequate rebuttal by the Government, the presumption should stand.

One positive result of the abolition of Confidential, of course, would be to focus proper attention on the meaning and significance of the remaining categories, Secret and Top Secret²¹ and the necessity of fully protecting information or material so identified. In this the Commission's survey of existing security legislation disclosed an anomalous situation. While the unauthorized disclosure of "classified information" by an officer or employee of the Government is subject to criminal penalties under certain conditions, there is no similar statute covering persons not in Government service, in the absence of proof of actual espionage. To correct this deficiency the Commission has recommended to Congress the passage of legislation which would establish criminal penalties where any individual *willfully* and *knowingly* communicates properly classified Top Secret or Secret information to an unauthorized person.²² Unintentional disclosures of classified information or even intentional disclosures of improperly classified information would not fall within its purview. The statute is not leveled at any one group but would extend to any person having access to classified information, including of course personnel of firms holding defense contracts.

This recommendation has, in my opinion, received unmerited criticism from some sources, including newsmen, on the ground that it would impose censorship on the press or serve as an instrument for suppression of information by corrupt Government officials. Others, including members of the press, have recognized the basic validity and need for such a law, and I am happy to report we have received no adverse comment from industry. While Government officials in the exercise of judgment are not infallible, nevertheless the responsibility for making decisions on classification matters must rest with them, subject to adequate reviews and inspections.²³ Absolute security is, of course, not only undesirable but impossible. Breach of trust in the Secret and Top Secret areas, however, must be circumscribed with reasonable but specific penalties.

Perhaps the most significant Commission recommendation, however, from the standpoint of increasing the efficient operation of the industrial security programs, is for the "consolidation of the industrial security programs of the . . . military services into a single, integrated program, devised, controlled, supervised, and operated by an Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense."²⁴

The Commission took this position in full appreciation of the fact that the most frequently prescribed—and often ill-advised—panacea for all the ills that beset the military services is "unification" of operations. It did so in the conviction, however, that no alternative solution could effectively bring an end to the diffusion of responsibility and resulting confusion of operations which currently exist in the administration of the program.

To provide a perspective for this proposal, let us look at the present organizational scheme: The Secretary of Defense, conconant with his responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,²⁵ has vested over-all responsibility for developing policies, procedures, and standards in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve. The Assistant Secretary coordinates the industrial security operations of the three separate services through the Director of the Office of Personnel Security Policy. Three primary documents govern the program; namely, the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation, used principally by Government security officers; the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information; and the Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulation which prescribes a uniform standard and criteria for determining access to classified information. Each of the military departments, however, actually exercises operational control over its own program. On paper this system of individual service autonomy with central co-

(Continued on page 28)

²⁰N. S. I. A. Report to CGS, dated October 31, 1956.

²¹Including also "Atomic Secret" and "Atomic Top Secret," the two categories recommended by the Commission for use by the Atomic Energy Commission. See p. 229 of CGS Report.

²²For the suggested legislation in its entirety, see CGS Report, p. 737.

²³The Commission has proposed a continuing review of the document classification program throughout the Government under the supervision of a Central Security Office. See CGS Report, pp. 89 (92).

²⁴See CGS Report, p. 289.

²⁵U. S. C. 171.

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Lloyd Wright (Continued)

ordination appears sound, particularly considering the size of each program. In practice it has resulted in extensive duplication of procedures, diverse interpretation of security regulations and criteria, with incident delays, unnecessary costs, and lessened efficiency. The principal criticism appears to be not one of disorganization but that the jealously guarded organization of each service has resulted in the conduct of three separate programs with consequent unnecessary administrative burdens on industry.

The following, for example, are representative statements made by officials of industrial concerns whose opinions were solicited by the Commission:

A New York firm:

"Briefly, I believe the problems are more of a straight administrative nature and that some of them are related to the fact that there are several types of clearances which are obtained and regulated through numerous agencies. We have been subjected to quite constant annoyance of submitting personnel security questionnaires and fingerprint cards on a multiple basis. It would seem to me that much would be accomplished by a coordination of clearances, no matter what the purpose, into one centralized agency. From the standpoint of industry I believe this would be most helpful." (Emphasis added.)

A Pennsylvania firm:

"In some cases a single individual has needed clearance for more than one agency, and separate applications and investigations had to be made for each agency involved. Previous clearances for one agency were not accepted by the others. This was time-consuming and wasteful, and appears to us to be unnecessary. Uniform clearance procedures are recommended, together with a central record office so that once an individual is cleared for one agency he does not have to be reinvestigated by the others.

"Also, regulations regarding the safekeeping of classified information are not uniform, even within the same agency."

A California firm:

"I feel that in the past years any confusion encountered by industry in setting up a security program has been caused by the failure of government to delegate one specific branch of the government to maintain jurisdiction and be responsible for the establishing of a basic security program and assisting industry in developing a program based on its individual needs and problems." (Emphasis added.)

The National Defense Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in a report to the Commission summed up the need for uniformity as follows:

"... it is imperative that we approach security planning on a more permanent and uniformly administered basis. Because present security programs require different rules by different agencies, there is a considerable amount of confusion and duplication in the administration of the various security programs."

It is well to remember that we are not here concerned with isolated criticism of the present system. The Commission was in touch with many officials employed in the field of industrial security. Eighty-

four percent of those contacted were in favor of vesting administrative responsibility in a single security agency. In the majority of all reports the Commission received, the general complaint is that most problems encountered by industry have been due to disordered administration caused by the diffusion of responsibility and the resulting proliferation of orders, regulations and interpretations.

Under these circumstances, the Commission felt that the establishment of a special office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the conduct of the military industrial security programs is imperative. Under its recommendation the proposed Office of Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be an operative office. The industrial security programs of the three armed services would be consolidated into a single integrated program. There would be a single set of regulations and uniform interpretation of the regulations. Security personnel now assigned to the individual services would be transferred to the Office of Security and this phase of activity discontinued within the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force. The industrial security provisions of defense contracts would be under the jurisdiction of the one office, with a resulting uniformity and consistency of approach.

Some of the advantages readily apparent from a single program would be: standardization of procedures; uniform application of security standards and criteria; improved classification, declassification and reevaluation of classification procedures; single agency cognizance for multiple-facility organizations; consistency in the interpretation of regulations; expediting of personnel and facility clearances; expediting of reactivation of terminated clearances; easier interchange of clearances; elimination of duplicate surveys of facilities; and elimination of duplicate personnel security questionnaires, fingerprint cards and other forms.

Once again it is recognized that the transition to a single program will precipitate certain administrative difficulties. Change in the machinery of Government is always accompanied by labor pains. In the effort to protect more effectively our national security, however, we should not permit the very volume and complexity of entrenched procedures to bar sound administrative reorganization.

The creation of a single military industrial program, of course, will not cure some of the administrative problems caused by the presence in this field of civilian Government agencies, particularly the Atomic Energy Commission. A number of knowledgeable groups have advocated the principle of central control and operation of all programs by one agency. The Commission considered this proposition but rejected it as administratively and practically unsound. In its opinion the separate substantive responsibilities of the DOD, the AEC, and other interested agencies make complete unification impossible. We did, however, recommend greater centralized coordination. We felt

that the basic policies and procedures governing all industrial security programs should be embodied in an Act of Congress or an Executive order²⁶ and included suggested language in a draft "Federal Security Act."²⁷ These provisions have been embodied in the legislation already introduced in the Senate and the House referred to earlier.

We have recommended a new independent office, the Central Security Office,²⁸ to coordinate not only the industrial security program but also related matters in connection with the civilian employees' loyalty program, the port security program, the document classification program, and the proposed civil air transport program. In the industrial security field the Central Security Office would provide for hearings and appeals in personnel security cases; assist in simplifying and bringing uniformity to procedures and practices as well as security manuals and forms used in the program; provide instructional discussions for security personnel; conduct conferences with representatives of industry and Government to correct program operational difficulties; promote greater exchange of clearances throughout the program,²⁹ and in general bring about greater uniformity, efficiency, and effectiveness.

The Central Security Office would be responsible directly to the President. Unlike the Office of Security proposed for the military industrial programs, it would

have no operating authority. Continued failure of an agency to comply with general policies, however, would be corrected through the Executive Offices.

The institution of new administrative systems, procedures, or regulations in themselves, however, cannot bring new life and greater efficiency to the industrial security programs. In the final analysis the caliber of security personnel, both in government and in industry, will determine in large part the degree of protection the national security will receive. "Without minimizing organization, methods and other elements, the prime requisite of a good administration is competent staff, particularly top-level staff."³⁰ In an early conference, Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, an adviser to the Commission, commented that it is more important to obtain men of integrity and common sense as security officers than it is to have a detailed set of security regulations. Rules and regulations, like death and taxes, we will continue to have, of course, but the need for competent men of demonstrated good judgment and character is perhaps greater in the security field than in many other occupations. The admixture of economic, legal, ideological, and sociological forces which come in to play in this area demand that security matters rest in responsible and capable hands.

I have been gratified and surprised by the high pro-
(Continued on next page)

²⁶C. G. S. Report, p. 289.

²⁷C. G. S. Report, pp. 291 (702) (716).

²⁸C. G. S. Report, p. 89.

²⁹For the Commission's specific recommendation on the transfer of personnel security clearances, see C. G. S. Report, p. 291.

³⁰"Staffing Democracy's Top Side" by John A. Perkins, President, University of Delaware—Public Administration Review, Winter 1957.



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Lloyd Wright (Continued)

professional level of security personnel in industry and in government. The very existence of the American Society for Industrial Security and the recognition it has received in a few short years attests to the growing stature of your profession. But your goal is not achieved. While most companies are attracting competent personnel with adequate compensation, recognition, and authority, a few continue to regard security work as a necessary but temporary evil, to be tolerated but not encouraged. This short-sighted attitude, of course, ignores the incontrovertible fact that security precautions will be a mandatory requisite of defense contractors as long as the menace of external and internal subversion continues. The arrest of additional Soviet spies is clear evidence that subversive activity has not abated. Boris Morros, recently revealed FBI counter-intelligence agent, was reported as stating, "I want to emphasize that the Russian plot is far more strongly organized in this country and throughout the world than is generally understood by our people."

American businessmen are not entirely blameless for the spirit and drift of the times. The protection of our treasured freedoms is not the sole responsibility of Government—it is the responsibility of every

American, and particularly of those who control American industry. "If we are to preserve human liberty and freedom, we cannot leave it to the politicians, their paid agents, and Government bureaus. We must leave it to the people who are students of liberty and freedom, who understand that liberty is indivisible, who understand that the free market not only in ideas but the free market in goods and services, including the money market, are integral parts of a free society."³¹ Industrial executives must recognize their own personal responsibilities and give the job of security the attention and support it deserves. Those directly engaged in industrial security cannot carry out their obligations efficiently or even satisfactorily without the personal help, encouragement, and participation of top management.

I join with every patriotic American in praying that there will be true peace in our time, but nothing I have learned, officially or personally, justifies its prediction. The universal recognition of this truth by industry will not only benefit industry itself, but also directly contribute to the safety and welfare of our beloved Nation.

³¹Dr. Emerson P. Schmidt, Director of Economic Research, Chamber of Commerce of the United States in an address before the Mortgage Bankers Association, New York City, April 16, 1957, as reprinted in part in *The Freeman*, August 1957.

Walsb (Continued)

But development and production are not enough when we face an adversary that has multiplied its own industrial strength to competitive peak. We must maintain our lead over a foe whose total ability to make war, in terms of sources of supply, plants and available labor pool, almost matches our own. To succeed we must do more than develop and produce. We must *protect* what we already have! We must keep knowledge of our weapons program away from the enemy as long as possible. It is obvious that if our lead consist of technical "know-how" it will evaporate in direct proportion to the extent our enemy learns that "know-how." Security is vital to defense and security in industry is as necessary as security in the military. In many cases it is more important because we build our lead in industry. And it is the industrial security officer who will be responsible for maintaining that security. The security officer in industry, more than any other person or agency, is charged with the task of insuring that whatever lead time we are able to achieve in new weap-

ons development is not lost through industrial espionage, malicious disclosure, or gross negligence. On his shoulders falls the great responsibility for protecting the data which means a balance of power favorable to the U. S. Such grave responsibility ought not be taken—or given—lightly.

By what standards, then, shall we measure a person for this responsibility? Certainly the Industrial Security Officer of 1944, or 1950, would find the situation today very different from what it was then. The lessons learned during WW II and in Korea have accounted for many changes both of concept and procedure in the present industrial security program. One standard, therefore, is that the security officer know the program. This means much more than a casual acquaintance with the Industrial Security Manual. It means a clear understanding of the relationship between Government and Industry through every phase of the procurement program from bidders' lists to shipping documents. It means an appreciation of the rationale of the program through study of its development

since 1940. Such milestones as the Armed Services Procurement Act and Regulations, Executive Orders 9835, 10450, 10104, and 10501, the Department of Defense Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulations, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ought to be part of the Security Officer's working knowledge, not mere references! He should be on intimate terms with the Bonsal Committee Report of the N. Y. C. Bar Association, the Johnston Sub-committee report of the U. S. Senate, the report of the Industrial Personnel Security Review Program of the Department of Defense, the Wright Commission Report, and the landmark federal court cases of *Kreznar vs Wilson*, *Green vs Wilson* and *Cole vs Young*. These are staples in the security diet.

The second requirement is that the Industrial Security Officer must know his firm. He must know what it does and what it can do as well as the operating staffs. Much unnecessary difficulty has been encountered by Industrial Security people because of ignorance of their own organizations. It is im-

(Continued on page 32)

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
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Walsb (Continued)

possible, and certainly very foolish, to sit in the seclusion of an office and issue procedures affecting organization elements whose real purpose is unknown. A considerable job of ferreting and foot-slogging falls to the security officer. He should expect it and be an active student of his firm's operations. It's a simple truth that you cannot understand what you do not first know. It follows with equal truth that you cannot regulate what you do not understand.

Third on the list of requirements for the Security Officer is Impartiality. Whether a clerk or a vice-president permits an unauthorized disclosure, the net result is the same—security compromise! A program designed for an entire firm will never work if it is applied rigorously to the lower levels but stops at the door to the executive suite. Management attitude will key the attitude of the whole organization—for good or bad. The program must be made active at every level. A Security Officer who deliberately avoids this responsibility is doing all concerned a disservice and his salary is a wasted investment.

As a fourth requirement I would list Decisiveness. Situations arise daily which do not always fall within the precise letter of the security regulations but which must be resolved immediately because of dangerous practices involved. Unless a security officer be prepared to decide such issues at once he runs the serious risk of losing respect for the program. Evasive tactics, dodging the issue, or ignoring it in the hope it will correct itself, can undo months of indoctrination and education.

It is possible to add qualities almost indefinitely to this checklist. No mention has yet been made of loyalty to the United States or of personal integrity, yet these are fundamental requirements without which an effective security program is unattainable. My purpose, however, is not to exhaust the list but simply to reemphasize a few qualities which the security officer, him-

self, sometimes fails to develop as fully as he should.

Given a Security Officer who possesses these qualities, and the others necessary to the position, what is he expected to do for the firm which employs him? More important, what are the obligations to his country which he assumes with his title? Again, a detailed list of duties would be a lengthy document. There are a smaller number, however, which take a priority. It is these we shall consider.

Before anything else there must be a clear understanding of his authority and the limits placed on it. He must have a voice in the making of security policy. Too often a security organization is given the task of enforcement but has no part in establishing the substance of the program. Security is intended to *prevent* loss of information. Only secondarily is its function to detect and apprehend a violator. The bulk of a security officer's expert talent should be directed at isolating and prescribing safeguards for the weak links in the chain. If the program is decided by persons not experts and the security officer is a mere policeman, there is the greatest likelihood that the program will fail of its objective. The very first responsibility of a security officer, then, is to convince management that he is a part of the management team.

From this, the second responsibility flows directly. The Security Officer who constructs the program must tailor it for his firm. An airframe manufacturer will not have the same problems as an engineering consultant service. A supplier of electronic components will be in a very different position from a shipbuilder. The Department of Defense makes its position clear in this regard with the requirement in the Security Agreement and the Revised Security Manual that contractors shall prepare security standard practices procedure. The Government Manual prescribes some general rules. Industry, company by company, must apply these rules. The Standard Practices Procedure becomes a contractor's "security

bible" and it is in this document that the program is form-fitted to the company. Unless the bible fits the company the security program will be either a series of crises or blunders. It is the security officer who must decide how his company will comply with general regulations. If he doesn't do it, or doesn't do it well, it is fairly certain no one else will.

The third important responsibility of the security officer is to build a strong security consciousness within his organization. People in general, Americans in particular, are reluctant to accept regulation—and especially so if it effects freedom of movement or expression. The only way to make this type of regulation work is to convince the objectors that it is truly necessary to achieve a greater good. This means clear and frequent explanation of the purpose and effects of security "do's" and "don't's." Nothing will provoke hostility more quickly than arbitrary or capricious rule making in the grand authoritarian style of "Do it or else." At the worst will result an active resistance which makes the security officer appear ridiculous and marks the end of his usefulness. At best there will be only token compliance, and this sort of passive resistance is a dry rot that in time, leaves a shell to the program. The responsibility for security education is a continuing one and involves *every* employee from the moment of hire to the day of termination. More than all the locks and badges, effective Security Education contributes to success. The experiences of advertising, psychology, industrial relations and human engineering are available to aid the Security Officer in this responsibility. He must have the sense to use them. Quite honestly, we recognize at Du Mont that we have just scratched the surface in this field. Our major security efforts are now bent on a good education program. We feel that our own people will cooperate willingly once they have a clear idea of the reasons.

Fourth among the Security Officer's prime responsibilities I would

rank Cooperation with other firms and other industries. And I mean active cooperation, in a spirit of mutual help, to work out common problems. After all, each of us is pledged to do the very same job—protect defense information entrusted to our firms. It doesn't make much sense if one firm affords certain classified information maximum protection and then lends or transmits it to another firm which permits its compromise through laxness or ignorance. I think an example of what I'm talking about will be familiar to us all. Determining visit categories is an area where greater cooperation is necessary. Some firms make a real effort to bring visit requests within the spirit as well as the letter of security regulations. Others take the course of least resistance. It may be more time consuming and require more administration to process a category 4 visit than to use rather general terms and handle it as a category 2, or pre-contractual visit. But a regular, tongue-in-cheek practice of doing the latter, is not only bad security, it is a contemptuous disregard for the labors of firms genuinely attempting to comply. Elimination of practices such as this is a goal of mutual cooperation.

Another facet of cooperation is interested membership in professional organizations. This must go beyond the clinking of cocktail glasses at annual banquets. To be meaningful it must include committee work and research projects. The professional groups are local as well as national in scope. Every security officer will find an organization suitable for his needs. He in turn should contribute to the needs of others, through the organization, by bringing to it the benefit of his advice and experience.

Voluntary meeting with the military, who have the often frustrating job of policing the industrial security program, is another means of cooperating. Such meetings go a long way towards promoting better understanding, and hence better security.

The last responsibility of a secu-

rity officer which deserves special mention is his obligation of efficiency. This is not quite the same as saying he must provide optimum security. It is that certainly, but it is more. It is the requirement that he do it within reasonable budgetary limits and that he keep his organization trim and smart. There has been an increasing trend to set up security organizations with divisional or departmental status and to require formal security budgets. This is a sound business practice and should be followed wherever possible. While it is true that security is a service organization and consequently a 100% cost item, it is also true that business experience has shown service organizations to be amenable to cost control methods. Optimum security does not necessarily imply maximum expense. On the other hand, a security group which has to beg for each pencil and eraser will not produce the desired result. A security officer who is familiar with cost control and who runs his organization within a well conceived budget which allows for contingencies is a corporate asset. It should also be remembered that many security costs are directly chargeable to the classified contacts in connection with which they are incurred. A formal budget will make these items readily identifiable and will permit proper allocations.

In further connection with costs, the Security Officer should be made aware of classified requests for quotations which are directed to his company in order that he may furnish an estimate of probable security costs for his firm's guidance in submitting its proposal. This is especially true in the fixed price type of contract where a large security cost, overlooked in preparing a proposal, could result in a loss to the company. It is not the intent of the industrial security program to cause a contractor to incur losses. However, the contractor must make timely demand for his legitimate, reimbursable costs. In the area of security, it is only reasonable to expect this information from the security officer.

My purpose has been to select

for comment a few of what I consider to be the more important attributes and functions of the Industrial Security Officer, in the hope that these remarks, in some way, will have contributed to a better appreciation of his very real importance to the defense effort. Without attempting to be dramatic I should like to close with one final observation. The Industrial Security Officer is a man with a mission. Upon its true and faithful execution may well depend our national survival!

Industrial Defense (Continued)

theft and pilferage, as well as sabotage, fire and flood.

If the United States industrial base were not plagued by annual losses of millions resulting from theft and pilferage, we would have few members in this Society. Industrial Defense is designed to prevent these two afflictions to the maximum possible degree through the application of the most modern principles of plant protection.

There are those who claim that only personnel security clearance programs can prevent sabotage. We submit that such administrative methods play an important role in sabotage prevention, even though an academic one. We further submit though, that the saboteur may not require clearance prior to scaling a wall, sweeping an office, driving a soft-drink truck, or effecting entry through an unprotected sewer line. The physical protection of critical areas, access to which may require no clearance, is as vital to continued production as the certainty that classified blueprints are only in the hands of those who have been properly investigated. Industrial Defense means the prevention of sabotage through the identification of critical areas and their subsequent protection against unauthorized entry. We keep the professional saboteur out—the one who does not bother to fill out a personal history statement.

Fire as an occupational industrial hazard needs no clarification.

(Continued on page 34)

Industrial Defense (Continued)

Our Industrial Defense specialists do not profess to check on the abilities of the Fire Underwriters representatives. We do, however, like to see that their recommendations are implemented immediately and not eleven months later, prior to their next annual visit. Good fire protection means lower insurance rates to your companies and to us it means less chance of interrupted production. Without that production we cannot fight. In addition, we also explore the type of employee fire brigade a key facility has in being. If needed, we fulfill our mission of assisting and advising management of such facilities by guiding them along the path which culminates in the establishment of such an auxiliary fire force. Fire means loss of production time—reduction of lost production time is Industrial Defense.

Those members, and the companies they represent, who are located in the New England, Kansas City and Yuba City areas (to mention only a few), know what floods mean to production. For full scale disasters, Texas City companies can speak with authority. Industrial Defense does not prevent them. We can, however, apply Industrial Defense principles in minimizing the effects of damage from such production killers. How high will the water go in your plant if the nearest dam breaks (there is no such thing as an impossibility), or if a sudden 6-inch rainfall falls in a few hours? It can't happen here? Ask the citizens of Chicago—it happened to them a few weeks ago.

"Massive Nuclear and thermonuclear attack can come only on paper in the annual Operation Alert!" Many have made this statement. We call it "The Prelude To A Lethargic State of Apathy," and would like to see the crystal ball of those adhering to this school of thought. The unclassified "Assumption for 1957" published as an Advisory Bulletin by FCDA tells us clearly and logically what the "potential" enemy can do. Some of our top military leaders have publicly stated that if this country is attacked, some of the bombers will get through. Is your plant going to

be hit? If you can answer this question in the negative, you do not need the portion of Industrial Defense designed to help our key facilities plan against overt enemy attack.

This then is Industrial Defense in a nutshell. A big puzzle which spells continuity of production and service when the pieces are properly fitted together. Department of Defense Survey officers visit key facilities at specified intervals to survey their progress in our field and assist and advise management in the voluntary development of industrial defense programs fitted to each particular plant.

The United States Army trains these officers at the Provost Marshal General's School at Fort Gordon, on the outskirts of Augusta, Georgia. The Provost Marshal General and his Military Police Corps are charged by the Army with Physical Security responsibilities and Industrial Defense training. To achieve the latter objective, a three-week industrial defense survey course is presented at the Military Police School. This course is taught in a special classroom equipped with amphitheater-type seating around a thirty-square foot scale model of an industrial complex. In addition, our classroom is "rigged" with the latest intrusion detection devices from electric eyes through ultrasonic, and equipped with special types of locks.

Our students, Department of Defense Industrial Survey Specialists, have to set up a complete industrial defense program for the model complex, which is theoretically located in a large city on the East Coast. To make the instruction more realistic we burn the place, blow it up, and drop a thermonuclear "egg" on the city. All the student has to do is to have a program which in each case will cause minimum interruption in production. Rough—yes, but every class accomplishes its goal prior to graduation.

The subjects covered in the three weeks of intensive study include Business Organization, Economic Mobilization, Plant Protection Hazards, Fire Protection, Plant Protection Organizations, Disaster

Planning, Industrial Mutual Aid Organization, Continuity of Industrial Personnel, Personnel Protection, Restoration of Functional Production Areas and Restoration of Utility Service, to name some. The School provides our people with basic ingredients to successful Industrial Defense Surveys. Our instruction is based upon realism and continuing contact with our field personnel.


This then is Industrial Defense—its major components and the way the Army trains the users of these tools.

Security is as strong as the weakest link. Industrial Security without Industrial Defense spells weakness. If we are indeed a Society for Industrial Security, let us not do only half the job, but also initiate Industrial Defense. In a conflict, hot or cold, limited or general, we pit the economy of one nation against that of another. Economy is dependent on Industrial Production. Without that production we cannot win—with it, we cannot lose.

TRAINING FILM SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY

The Department of Defense will release a new industrial security training film. The new color film is called "Symposium On Security" and is designed primarily for showing to audiences of scientific, engineering, and technical personnel. This is a 16mm technicolor film that runs for 24 minutes. It consists of a series of presentations by top government and scientific authorities and a discussion of security practices as they affect persons engaged on classified research and development projects for the Department of Defense.

It is expected that cognizant security offices of the Military Departments will have prints available for loan about the first of November. The film will be available for purchase through commercial channels within the next six weeks. As soon as arrangements have been completed for the sale of the film an announcement will be made in a Department of Defense Industrial Security Letter, quoting the price and giving instructions regarding the placing of orders for the film.



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